Dairy farmers in the South have become increasdependency of these two developments. ingly interested in gaining a stronger bargaining position in the market arena for the purpose of obtaining CONSEQUENCES OF PRODUCER a more favorable price for their milk. They have im-BARGAINING POWER plemented this objective by organizing cooperative associations. Cooperative bargaining relationships have Bargaining power depends on the degree of control been of three types (1) bargaining between seller and exercised over the variables that affect prices and buyer (bilateral competition), (2) bargaining between quantities. If price enhancement, with possible insellers or bargaining between buyers (interfirm concreased gross income to farmer members, is the obpetition), and (3) bargaining in or through the political jective then a cooperative association must ask itself economy [3] .
what variables affect the price and revenue and what control does it have over the identified variables. Bargaining through the political economy has been the primary means of obtaining a protected price. With
Several illustrations are used to show the probable state and federal milk orders, dairy producers have longer run consequences resulting from bargaining bargained at open hearings over provisions of the action by a producer's association. Each of the actions orders rather than submit to price bargaining in the taken is one of several variables in which an association market [3] . Prices are then administered by public may be able to exercise varying degrees of control. authority. Producer associations in the South have Certain assumptions are made with regard to supply also enjoyed success by bargaining directly with buyers response and demand response to price changes. The to obtain negotiated Class I prices above the minimum supply response, due to price changes, may be differfederal order Class I prices. Bargaining between proent for each individual producer but for the aggregate ducer associations has occurred under conditions of all producers it is assumed to be inelastic. The where a market is short of milk. The cooperative in price elasticity of demand for fluid milk products is the market bargains with an association outside the also assumed to be inelastic. market for a necessary supply of milk to satisfy the short run needs.
Price as a Variable
Recently, two developments affecting producer Under these conditions, a given quantity of milk bargaining power have occurred. Nearly 12,000 dairy OQO will clear the market as fluid products at some farmers in 11 southern states organized two large price OP 0 ( Figure 1A ). The classified pricing program, regional milk marketing cooperatives. On the product established under Federal and State orders, has given side of the market, there is a continuing pressure to producers the opportunity to obtain from the market introduce filled milk and nondairy products in sema higher price for milk utilized in fluid products than blance of milk in southern markets. These two defor milk utilized in other products [5] . Also, the velopments appear only remotely related, but cannot government price support has established a price floor be divorced from one another. Economic theory and for surplus milk. Thus, producers sell milk in two available data provide evidence to support the markets; one market for fluid products shown as an selling a reduced portion of the supply at the higher Supply control has been successful through the Demand as a Variable use of various types of base-excess plans. Many of the plans were used as a means of bringing seasonal proDairy farmers prefer demand expansion rather than duction more in line with seasonal needs in the market.
supply control. Producer cooperatives have attempted In a few markets in the Southeast, the adoption of through various promotion schemes to bring about Class I base plans has been successful as a means of expansion of demand but with limited success. A controlling supplies in relation with fluid product shift in aggregate demand to the right, D 2 D 2 ,in Figure needs. These were adopted under state milk orders 1 B, through such factors as population increases, high-(Virginia and Georgia) or within a cooperative such as er income levels or effective promotion, would inin the Memphis market and more recently by Milk crease consumption to OQ5, and increase producer Producers, Inc. The Class I base plan was successful blend prices to B 3 on the supply curve SISI or to in Georgia with producers adjusting their deliveries B 5 on the supply curve S2S 2 . The supplies would be well in line with the sales changes of individual handexpected to change in relation to changes in the blend lers [2] . Essentially, such a plan leaves the decision prices with equilibrium supplies at OQ8 or OQ 1 0. up to the individual producer in regard to his producing primarily for the fluid market or for both the Mixed patterns of demand have been evident in fluid and manufacturing milk market.
southeastern markets. Per capita consumption of whole milk items in many southeastern markets has In a study by Gaumnitz and Reed, recognition was decreased in the 5 years, 1963-67 ( Table 2 ). The states given of the relationship of price policies of the probordering the Atlantic coast have shown increases. ducer association and the degree of control of total Skim mi items have shown increases in most of the producer sales [4] . They stated, "...the greater the markets. In the 1966-67 period, the 12 markets with degree to which the cooperative controls the total Federal orders showed an increase of 20 percent in supply of milk available in the market, the closer the skim milk and a 2 percent decrease in whole milk.
demand curve for the milk sold by the cooperative
The increase in skim milk items has come primarily will approach that of the market as a whole... . under from the introduction of lower butterfat higher solids complete control the extent to which commodity -nonfatfluidmilk productsin severalmarkets. price discrimination is practiced will probably be found to be greater than when a smaller degree of Price increases to producers have generally been control is exercised " passed on to consumers. The change in dealer buying price of milk in the 1963-67 period was in the range Spotn evidec s s a p e of 2 to 6 cents per gallon of whole milk (Table 3) . Supporting evidence shows a picture of mixed Prices in the store changed at least the same amount responses. In the 5 years, 1963-67, producer associor more in the same period in southeastern markets. ations in the southeastern states can be credited i-
The response by consumers to these price. changes directly with bringing about producer price increases showed mixed patterns. In nine markets, changes in through Federal and State milk orders and directly by per capita consumption were in the expected direction; obtaining negotiated prices above Federal order minia one percent increase in price was accompanied by a mums. (Table 1) .
BARGAINING POWER Increased prices have not resulted in burdensome Fluid milk products have been, traditionally, a supplies in most southeastern markets. Cow numbers stable and important part of the diet and generally dropped drastically and producer exit was substantial exempt from competitive products. Thus, changes in [7] . In contrast, production per cow increased about the level of the price of milk relative to other food 300 pounds per year and average receipts per proitems have had only a minor impact on the level of ducer increased, indicating adoption of known techconsumption. However, the threat of substitutes, such nology. The result has been almost no significant as filled milk and nondairy products in the semblance change in total milk production, 15.2 billion pounds of milk, makes such products important variables in in 1963 and 15.1 billion in 1967. It appears that the the bargaining power process. Meeting power with aggregate supply schedule shifted to the left relatively power can become a never ending spiral. If farmers the same supply, but at a higher price.
and dairy firms are successful in neutralizing one [6] . With these price dif-/ I ferences between whole milk and other products, or in fact the upper section of the curve may become uantity more elastic. This is illustrated as a kinked demand curve with the kink at the point where the price of whole milk and substitute products are equal, OP on FIGURE 2. LONG RUN CONSEQUENCES OF the demand curve D 2 D 2 . The kinked demand curve PRODUCER ACTIONS WITH AN is based on the assumption that as the price of fluid INCREASED ELASTICITY FOR milk is increased above this level, the quantityof fluid FLUID MILK PRODUCTS milk will decrease more rapidly than before the introduction of the substitute.
The quantity of milk demanded would decrease from OQ 1 to OQ3, blend prices will decrease from B 1 to B 2 , and the supply will decrease from OQ4 to to OQ2. This is the probable outcome to producers if there is no change in the price of milk utilized in fluid products and surplus is purchased at the support price OP s.
CONCLUSIONS
If, in the longer run, consumers accept substitute products, the demand for fluid milk may become more Prospective gains, through mergers of producer elastic as shown by the extension of the upper kinked associations giving them control of larger supplies part of the D 2 curve to D 3 D 3 . The quantity demandof milk, should be evaluated in terms of the impact on ed would decrease to OQ7, blend price may decrease the utilization of milk. Countervailing power should to B 3 and the supply would decrease to OQ6. With not be exercised without a thorough analysis of conthe more elastic demand situation, a much greater sequences in the consumer market. Some of the varishift in the supply SISI to S 2 S 2 would be necessary ables are exogenous to the control of the bargaining to bring the blend price up to the B 2 level. Either the group. The primary ones identified in this analysis lower blend prices would force producer exit or more are the demand for fluid milk products and substitutes drastic supply control measures would be necessary that may enter the market place. Demand, in this or a combination of both. In any case, the total sense, appears to be outside the direct control and revenue to producers would decrease. Producer associmanipulation of any bargaining group. Therefore, in ation actions to enhance price would be much more the longer run bargaining power may not be as suclimited with the more elastic demand for milk. cessful as desired by producer associations.
